Showing posts with label Close Games. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Close Games. Show all posts

Thursday, July 29, 2010

Close Games -- Who the 'Cats Relied on at Crunch Time



Scottie and Who?
I ran across an article, "Ice Water in Their Veins", by College Chalk Talk publisher Chris DiSano that looks at how a number of A10 guards performed in tight games. A terrific read by the way, one that should appeal to an audience larger than A10 fans and the five schools whose guards Chris took the time to compile statistics about. And for those fans (mostly from Xavier I suspect...) who question Kevin Anderson's A10 POY award, Chris provides a powerful statistical argument for why the Spider guard was so deserving. With Chris' approach and methodology in mind, I wondered if the same methodology, applied to Villanova's games last season, could provide some insight into what happened, especially during the team's stretch run. Games from February and March -- that's one frog I have been reluctant to dissect this off season -- but Chris gave me a few ideas on how to organize the data and focus my questions.

A Few Tweaks & Modifications On Chris' Approach
Chris wanted to know how Kwame Mitchell compared to Jordan Crawford, among others, in high pressure situations, so compiling the raw data from play-by-plays would be sufficient to see who took the shots and (more importantly) how efficiently they converted those shots to points. What I wanted to know (among other things), was who played during the crucial sequences, who among those on the floor was most likely to take the shot, and how they did. Like Chris I wanted to look at close games, but since this was about a specific team over the course of a season, I decided to look at all close games, regular and post season games, if they met my "close game" criteria. Chris looked at the end score to decide if the game was "close". I decided to look at the score at the five minute mark, and if the game was "close" (+-5 points) at that point in time, I would break down the play-by-play. Of Villanova's 33 game season, the 'Cats and their opponents were within five points (roughly 2-3 possessions) in 11 of those games (that's about 1 in 3 games)...

@5:00Final
DateOpponentPFPAPFPANotes
Thu Nov 19George Mason 56566968
Sun Dec 13at Temple59636575
Sat Jan 2at Marquette 67667472
Sat Jan 9Marquette 67637876
Mon Jan 11at Louisville 77749284
Sun Jan 17Georgetown 67658277
Sun Feb 21at Pittsburgh 49516570
Sat Mar 6West Virginia 50456668OT (60)
Thu Mar 11Marquette (BET)57627680
Thu Mar 18Robert Morris (NCAA)47517370OT (58)
Sat Mar 20St. Mary's (NCAA)61616875

Of the 11 games close at the 5:00 minute mark, three (Temple, Louisville and St. Mary's) were not "close" at the buzzer. Of the 22 games "not close" at the 5:00 minute mark, one, Villanova's March 2 game at Cincinnati, was a "close" game at the end (a 77-73 win), but the 'Cats held a 10 point margin with five minutes to go. A play-by-play breakdown is not necessary to see that in the six close games in November through January Villanova was 5-1, while in the five close games in February and March (notice the last four games Villanova played were all "close"?) the 'Cats were 1-4. Comparing the players' minutes, scoring efficiency and rebounding from the first set of games to those from the second set does reveal several changes over the course of the season. The first six games...

FTA
%Min%ShoteFG%PPWSOR%FGA
Armwood13.418.2150.02.000.0200.0
Cheek30.28.10.00.330.0400.0
Fisher50.338.812.50.366.975.0
King57.017.187.51.7512.10.0
Pena67.114.525.00.8010.350.0
Redding57.021.440.01.006.0160.0
Reynolds97.330.162.51.357.1133.3
Stokes67.17.30.0NA0.00.0
Sutton13.418.2100.02.0025.70.0
Wayns30.224.250.01.400.0133.3

Scottie's 30.1% shooting percentage (he took 30% of the available shots when he was on the floor) is no surprise. Overall Scottie was taking 25-27% of the shots during the season (see Villanova's Team Page over at Ken Pomeroy's web site); taking over in tight games is consistent with "go-to guy" responsibilities, and the staff, by allowing him to take 97% of the minutes in those situations (far above his overall Min% for the season), suggest they expected him to take over in those situations. The surprse (there are a few of them) is Fisher's 38% shot rate. In his freshman season Corey had games where he took a very large proportion of the shots, about 28%-30%, depending on the game. In this first series of games however, Fisher struggled with his shot. A 12.5% eFG% is terrible, and given Corey's tendency to "keep shooting", finding he gets about 50% of the available time is hardly surprising. Wayns and Redding (whose suspension ended in mid December, making Reggie available for the last four games in the series) were servicable second options on offense. Neither posted eye-popping shooting numbers, but (check their FTA/FGA rate) each was a slasher and able to get to the line. King, Sutton, and Armwood were efficient secondary contributors. King in particular shot an efficient 3-4 from the court and 2-2 from the line. Stokes' numbers are extremely low, like Cheek and Pena, his contributions were not in shot conversion, even though he pulled in 67% of the playing time in those high pressure situations. Some of the secondary numbers...

FGM%3FGM%2FGM%FTM%Ast%DR%
Armwood100.0100.0NA50.00.00.0
Cheek0.00.0NA25.00.019.8
Fisher12.50.050.033.33.34.8
King75.050.0100.0NA0.028.2
Pena25.0NA25.0100.00.013.8
Redding40.00.050.062.50.09.4
Reynolds50.075.037.575.01.98.7
Stokes0.00.00.0NA0.04.6
Sutton100.0NA100.0NA0.00.0
Wayns33.3100.00.0100.01.40.0

A check on King's and Pena's OR% (offensive rebounding rate) and DR% (defensive rebounding rate) provide a big hint about why these two were on the floor. Neither was the focal point of the offense, but both were very strong on the boards. King's numbers in particular are impressive. While the staff clearly favored a rotation of Reynolds, Pena, Stokes, Redding, King and Fisher, the staff used 12 players total over those six games, using either eight or nine players in five of the six games. Seven players saw action in the Temple loss. Data for the second series of games shows a very clear break in player roles and the rotation used by the staff...

FTA
%Min%ShoteFG%PPWSOR%FGA
Armwood8.8NANANA0.0NA
Cheek26.316.90.0NA0.00.0
Fisher70.231.765.01.410.070.0
King11.7NANANA0.0NA
Pena67.313.275.01.570.0150.0
Redding84.813.10.00.509.8120.0
Reynolds90.634.339.31.234.6135.7
Stokes90.614.7100.01.860.033.3
Sutton5.838.00.0NA0.00.0
Wayns17.512.7100.02.000.00.0
Yarou26.316.9100.02.0015.8200.0

The time allocation shuffles aside, the most obvious change is Scottie and Fisher. Scottie's efficiency (eFG%) crashed, though he continued to get to the line. The number of shots he took rose very slightly, but his Shot% increased 4% because his minutes declined slightly (possession-based stats calculate proportions based on the percentage of time a player is allocated), but he continued to get to the line. Fisher's role (Shot%) declined even as his playing time (and efficiency) increased dramatically. Stokes' time also increased, his outstanding shooting efficiency (coupled with improved rebounding numbers) making a argument to increase his time. The freshmen, Yarou excepted, saw their minutes remain constant or decline slightly. Yarou, his early season protocol largely completed, was working himself back into the rotation. The offense revolved nearly exclusively around Scottie and Corey F, all other members of the roatation, though they might have slightly more time allocated, nearly disappear during crunch time. The secondary numbers...

FGM%3FGM%2FGM%FTM%Ast%DR%
ArmwoodNANANANA0.00.0
Cheek0.0NA0.0NA0.00.0
Fisher60.050.062.585.70.50.0
KingNANANANA1.96.3
Pena75.0NA75.083.30.019.6
Redding0.00.00.066.70.318.4
Reynolds35.716.750.094.71.39.0
Stokes66.766.7NA50.00.013.5
Sutton0.0NA0.0NA0.00.0
Wayns100.0NA100.0NA0.00.0
Yarou100.0NA100.0100.01.05.8

Scottie's three point conversion rate crashed, the single biggest reason for his overall decline in efficiency during crunch time in those games. Rebounding also disappeared. Offensive rebounding, Yarou and Redding excepted, virtually disappeared. Scottie snagged a rebound, but the squad as a whole did not go after their teammate's missed shots. Defensive rebounding was only very modestly better. Pena, Redding, Stokes and even Scottie grabbed defensive rebounds, but the overall rate was low. Yarou showed a good instinct for offensive boards, but was strangly ineffective on the defensive boards.

Random Thoughts...
1. Marquette and Villanova played three games in the 2010 season, all three decided by four or fewer points. Villanova won the two regular season meetings by two points apiece. The Golden Eagles took the Big East Tournament game by four points, effectively evening the series (by point differentials). The reason for the close games (even those played last season were relatively close) may be due to the very similar style of play. The 'Cats may have Yarou for the next season or so, but through last season (the first two meetings anyway) neither squad had a 6-10 or taller big who was effective.
2. The assist rates were surprisingly low, even when the squad was winning the close games. The style of play values one-on-one play and lane penetration (which explains the relatively high FTA/FGA rates), but both Scottie and Fisher were top 500 (per Pomeroy) assist leaders during the season, logging rates >21.0%. Assist rates below 10% for both players suggest the squad's two strongest offensive players did little to involve their teammates at this very crucial time.

Wednesday, August 19, 2009

Experience and Close Games

Definitions and Methods
2009 was not notable for close games, at least not until the post season. A "close game" is one decided by 5 points or less. The 5 point margin suggests that the decision could have turned on 2 or fewer possessions -- a game that was probably settled in the last minute or so. Who would be more likely to play close games? A team with a bad record (like Notre Dame back in 2007)? I sorted the conference by percentage of the team's schedule that contained close games...

Record% ofExp.
TeamWLPctSchYrs
Seton Hall740.6360.3441.65
Rutgers560.4550.3441.39
Villanova720.7780.2372.04
Marquette440.5000.2292.45
Georgetown160.1430.2261.11
DePaul430.5710.2121.20
West Virginia340.4290.2001.26
South Florida150.1670.1941.58
Syracuse520.7140.1841.65
Providence330.5000.1822.53
Cincinnati410.8000.1561.29
Louisville410.8000.1351.72
Notre Dame310.7500.1112.48
St. John's301.0000.0880.86
Connecticut201.0000.0562.20
Pittsburgh110.5000.0561.94
Overall57430.5700.187

The table shows the team's record in close games, the percentage of the schedule that involved close games and lastly, Ken Pomeroy's Experience Level, a stat in which he combines minutes played with class. The Overall line sums wins, losses calculates the winning percentage and the close games as a percentage of all games played. [Note the winning percentage is > .500 because I have included all games -- OOC, conference & post season -- for each team]

Did "not very good teams" play more close games? Well, yes...and no. True, Seton Hall and Rutgers did have the most close games, about 1/3 of their schedule was decided by 5 points or less, but Villanova and Marquette, two teams that finished near the top of the conference were just behind. That set of two paired teams provide an interesting snapshot on their seasons, relative to each other. In close games Seton Hall pulled out over 60% of them, while Rutgers could not break even, a capsule statement of their respective seasons and records. The same holds for Villanova and Marquette. Many had those two teams in a virtual tie in the Big East standings going into the season, but the Wildcats held a very healthy margin in the close games. The Golden Eagles stood at 50% (four of those games occurred after Dom James ended his season with an injury; Marquette went 1-3 in those games...another effect of losing the senior guard?). While Connecticut and Pittsburgh, two 1st quartile teams had the fewest close games (Pittsburgh's in particular, were badly timed), but St. John's and Notre Dame, two teams that finished in the bottom half of the conference played only a single close game more than UConn and Pitt.

The two "losingest" teams, Georgetown and South Florida really caught my eye. Among teams that had 20% or more of their schedule decided by 5 points or less, those two had strikingly poor winning percentages. While the folks over at the Hoya Prospectus Blog have examined the Georgetown season in detail in an attempt to construct a narrative of the 2009 season, I have not seen a post that explains this abnormally low winning percentage, though a post on experience discussed overall performance (and concluded it was not a decisive factor). If Villanova is an outlier (on the high side), those two were clear outliers on the low side. Ironically one of Villanova's close losses and Georgetown's single close game win -- was the 2/28 game played at the Wachovia.

Learn Anything in the School of Hard Knocks?
Georgetown was one of the "younger" teams in the Big East. Was their bad run (as suggested by a few fans & examined in depth by statistical analysis) a product of their youth? The Hoya Prospectus Blog (see above) says "no", but my question is more specific -- was youth a factor when the game was close? Looking at all of the Big East teams (same set of games), for each close game, I compared the experience-level of the two squads to determine if the "more experienced" squad won. Going back to each team, I reclassified each close game according to whether the result was consistent with the experience level of the two teams -- ie "did the more experienced team win?". The survey yields a few interesting nuggets...

W/L vs ExpExp.
TeamAg.Dis.Pct.Yrs.
Syracuse701.0001.65
Connecticut201.0002.20
Pittsburgh201.0001.94
West Virginia610.8571.26
Cincinnati410.8001.29
Notre Dame310.7502.48
Rutgers830.7271.39
Seton Hall830.7271.65
Louisville320.6001.72
DePaul430.5711.20
Georgetown430.5711.11
Villanova540.5562.04
Marquette440.5002.45
Providence330.5002.53
South Florida240.3331.58
St. John's030.0000.86
Overall65350.650

I sorted the data by the "expectations percentage" and included Pomeroy's experience level as a point of comparison. Hmmm, these results look pretty interesting. True Connecticut and Pittsburgh offer a sample too small to draw conclusions, but Syracuse and West Virginia look pretty conclusive. Seton Hall and Rutgers show consistent results (even though their won/loss records in close games were very different). Even down-on-their-luck DePaul and contrarian Georgetown show reults that agreed more than disagreed with the experience expectation. Looking at the bottom of the table, St. John's and South Florida appear to be counter intuitive (but consider that two of St. John's counter-expectation wins came versus Georgetown...that team again).

Marquette and Providence came at .500, both for winning percentage in close games (4-4, 3-3 respectively) and for "experience result consistency". They caught my eye because they are two of the more experienced teams in the conference -- Marquette was ranked #1 in the Big East according to Pomeroy, while Providence was #3, behind Notre Dame. Common sense (and this data) suggest they underperformed. Both also had 1st year coaches, relatively inexperienced 1st year coaches. Buzz Williams and Keno Davis each logged a single season as head coach before coming into the Big East.